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Abstract:
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses individual light quanta in quantum superposition
states to guarantee unconditional communication security between distant parties. In 
practice, the achievable distance for QKD has been limited to a few hundred kilometers, 
due to the channel loss of fibers or terrestrial free space that exponentially reduced the 
photon rate. Satellite-based QKD promises to establish a global-scale quantum network 
by exploiting the negligible photon loss and decoherence in the empty out space. Here, 
we develop and launch a low-Earth-orbit satellite to implement decoy-state QKD with 
over kHz key rate from the satellite to ground over a distance up to 1200 km, which is 
up to 20 orders of magnitudes more efficient than that expected using an optical fiber 
(with 0.2 dB/km loss) of the same length. The establishment of a reliable and efficient 
space-to-ground link for faithful quantum state transmission constitutes a key milestone
for global-scale quantum networks.
Introduction
Private and secure communications are fundamental human needs. Traditional public 
key cryptography usually relies on the perceived computational intractability of certain 
mathematical functions. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD)1 proposed in the 
mid-1980s—the best known example of quantum cryptographic tasks—is a radical new 
way to offer an information-theoretically secure solution to the key exchange problem, 
ensured by the laws of quantum physics. QKD allows two distant users, who do not 
share a long secret key initially, to produce a common, random string of secret bits,
called a secret key. Using the one-time pad encryption, this key is proven to be secure
by Shannon2 to encrypt (and decrypt) a message, which can then be transmitted over a 
standard communication channel. In the QKD, the information is encoded in the
superposition states of physical carriers at single-quantum level, where photons, the 
fastest flying qubits with their intrinsic robustness to decoherence and ease of control,
are usually used. Any eavesdropper on the quantum channel attempting to gain 
information of the key will inevitably introduce disturbance to the system, and can be 
detected by the communicating users.
Since the first table-top QKD experiment3 in 1989 with a quantum channel distance of 
32 cm, a strong research effort has been devoted to achieve secure QKD at long distance, 
eventually aiming at global scale for practical use. The most straightforward method is 
directly sending single photons through optical fibers or terrestrial free-space. In both 
cases, however, the channel loss cause a decrease of the transmitted photons that scales
exponentially with the length. Unlike classical telecommunications, the quantum signal 
in QKD cannot be noiselessly amplified due to the quantum non-cloning theorem4. This 
limits the maximal distance for secure QKD to a few hundred kilometers5. Beyond this 
length scale, quantum communications become extremely challenging6.
To overcome this problem, one solution is to employ quantum repeaters7 that combine 
entanglement swapping8, entanglement purification9, and quantum memories10. In spite 
of remarkable progress in the demonstrations of the three building blocks11–13 and even
prototype quantum repeater nodes14-18, these laboratory technologies are still far from 
being practically applicable in realistic long-distance quantum communications.
A more direct and promising solution for global-scale QKD is through satellites in space.
Compared with terrestrial channels, the satellite-to-ground connection has significantly 
reduced losses19. This is mainly because that the effective thickness of the atmosphere
is ~10 km, and most of the photon’s propagation path is in empty space with negligible 
absorption and turbulence. A ground test20 in 2004 has demonstrated the distribution of 
entangled photon pairs over a noisy ground atmosphere of 13 km—beyond the effective 
thickness of the aerosphere—and showed the survival of entanglement and violation of 
Bell’s inequality. Further verifications of the feasibilities of the satellite-based QKD,
under the simulated conditions of huge attenuation and various turbulence, have been
performed at even longer distance21–23, on rapidly moving platforms24,25, and exploiting 
satellite corner cube retroreflectors26,27.
We have developed a sophisticated satellite, named after Micius, dedicated for quantum 
science experiments (for the project timeline and its design details, see Methods), which 
was successfully launched on 16th August 2016, from Jiuquan, China, orbiting at an 
altitude of ~500 km (Fig. 1a). Using one of the satellite payloads—a decoy-state QKD 
transmitter at 850 nm wavelength—and cooperating with Xinglong ground observatory 
station (near Beijing, 40°23’45.12’’N, 117°34’38.85’’E, altitude 890m), we establish 
the decoy-state QKD with polarization encoding from the satellite to the ground with 
~kHz rate over a distance up to 1200 km.
Experimental challenges and solutions
A robust and efficient satellite-to-ground QKD places a more stringent requirement on 
the link efficiency than conventional satellite-based classical communication systems. 
To obtain a high signal-to-noise ratio, one cannot increase the signal power, but only 
reduce the channel attenuation and background noise. In our experiment, several effects
contribute to channel loss, including beam diffraction, pointing error, atmospheric 
turbulence and absorption.
In our QKD experiment, we adopt the downlink protocol—from the satellite to ground
(see Fig. 1a). In the downlink, beam wandering caused by the atmospheric turbulence 
occurs in the very end of the transmission path (near the earth surface), where the beam 
size due to diffraction is typically much larger than the beam wandering. Therefore, the 
downlink has reduced beam spreading compared to the uplink and thus has higher link 
efficiency.
The beam diffraction mainly depends on telescope size. To narrow the beam divergence, 
we use a 300-mm aperture Cassegrain telescope in the satellite (Fig. 1b) optimized to 
eliminate chromatic and spherical aberrations, which sends the light beam with a near-
diffraction-limited far-field divergence of ~10 μrad. After a travel distance of 1200 km, 
we expect the beam diameter expands to about 10 m. At the ground station, a Ritchey-
Chretien telescope with an aperture of 1 m and a focal length of 10 m (Fig. 1c) is used 
to receive the QKD photons (see Methods). The diffraction loss is estimated to be 22
dB at 1200 km.
The narrow divergence beam from the fast-moving satellite (with a speed of ~7.6 km/s) 
demands a high-bandwidth and high-precision acquiring, pointing, and tracking (APT) 
system to establish a stable link. We design cascaded multi-stage APT systems in the 
transmitter (Fig. 1b) and the receiver (Fig. 1c). Initial coarse orientation of the telescope 
is based on forecasted satellite orbit position with an uncertainty below 200 m. The 
satellite attitude control system itself ensures the transmitter pointing to the ground 
station with ~0.5° precision. The satellite and the ground station send beacon lasers to 
each other with a divergence of 1.25 mrad and 0.9 mrad, respectively (Fig. 2a). The 
coarse pointing stage in the satellite transmitter consists of a two-axis gimbal mirror 
(with a range of 10° in both azimuth and elevation) and a CMOS camera with a field-
of-view of 2.3°×2.3° and frame rates of 40 Hz. The fine pointing stage uses a fast 
steering mirror driven by piezo ceramics (with a tracking range of 1.6 mrad) and a 
camera with a field-of-view of 0.64 mrad×0.64 mrad and frame rates of 2 kHz. Similar 
coarse and fine APT systems are also equipped in the ground station (see Extended Data 
Table 2 for details). Using a feedback closed-loop, the transmitter achieves a tracking 
accuracy of ~1.2 μrad (see Fig. 2b), much smaller than the beam divergence. We 
estimate that at 1200 km the loss due to atmospheric absorption and turbulence is in the 
range of 3 dB to 8 dB, and the loss due to pointing error is less than 3 dB.
Furthermore, we use temporal and spectral filtering to suppress the background noise. 
The beacon laser, with a 0.9-ns pulse width and a ~10-kHz repetition rate, serves for 
both the APT and synchronization. In a good co-alignment with the QKD photons, the 
beacon laser can be separated by a dichroic mirror and detected by a single-photon 
detector in the ground station for timing information. Thus, we avoid the space-ground 
clock drift, and obtain a synchronization jitter of 0.529 ns, which is used to tag the 
received signal photons within a 2-ns time window and filter out the background noise. 
In addition, spectrally, we use a bandwidth filter in the receiver to reduce the 
background scattering. In the current experiment, we limit ourselves to night-time 
operation only to avoid sun light.
Finally, we note that the relative motion of the satellite and the ground station induces 
a time-dependent rotation of the photon polarization seen by the receiver. During one 
orbit, theoretically we can predict that the polarization contrast ratio would drop from 
150:1 to 0 (Fig. 2c). To solve this problem, we calculate rotation angle offset by taking 
into account of their relative motion and all the birefringent elements in the optical path. 
Using a motorized HWP for dynamical polarization compensation during the satellite 
passage, the average polarization contrast ratio increases to 280:1, as shown in Fig. 2c.
Experimental procedure and results
In our experiment, we use the decoy-state28,29 Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)1 protocol
for the QKD, which can detect photon-number-splitting eavesdropping and thus allow 
secure QKD using weak coherent pulses with significantly increased distance and rate. 
The key method is to use multiple intensity levels at the transmitter’s source, one signal 
state (mean photon number μs) and several decoy states (μ1, μ2, …) which are randomly 
interspersed. Here we adopt a 3-intensity protocol using three levels of μ: a high μs, a 
moderate μ1 and a zero μ2 (vacuum), sent with probabilities of 50%, 25%, and 25%, 
respectively, which are optimized by performing simulations to maximize the secret bit 
rate for the satellite-to-ground channel.
For downlink QKD, a space-qualified transmitter is integrated in the satellite (see Fig. 
1b). Eight fiber-based laser diodes—four used as signal and four as decoy state—emit 
laser pulses (848.6 nm, 100 MHz, 0.2 ns). The output power of the eight laser didoes 
are monitored in real time by internal integrated photodetectors and remotely controlled 
by closed-loop systems, which precisely set the required intensity of the signal and 
decoy states and stabilize with less than 5% variation. In-orbit measurements show that 
with independent temperature tuning of the eight lasers, their wavelengths are matched 
within 0.006 nm, much smaller than their intrinsic bandwidth (~0.1 nm). The lasers are 
synchronized to be within <10 ps, much smaller than their pulse duration of ~200 ps.
The output beams are coaligned to ensure that both concentricity and coaxiality are 
better than 95%.
The light beams are then sent to a BB84-encoding module consisting of a half-wave 
plate (HWP), two polarizing beam splitters (PBSs), and a beam splitter (BS), which 
randomly prepares the emitted photons in one of the four polarization states: horizontal, 
vertical, linear +45° and -45°. A physical thermal noise device generates a 4-bit random 
number for each run that drives the eight lasers and determines the output polarization 
and intensity levels. Independent electric control of the eight lasers and adjustment of 
the attenuation allow us to accurately obtain the average photon number in the output 
of the telescope: μs=0.8, μ1=0.1, μ2=0. In the ground station, a compact decoding setup 
consisting of a BS, two PBSs, and four single-photon detectors (efficiency 50%, dark 
counts <25 Hz, timing jitter 350 ps) are used for polarization state analysis (see Fig. 1c
and Methods). The overall optical efficiency including the receiving telescope and the 
fiber coupling on the ground station is ~16%. The satellite uses radio frequency channel 
for classical communication with the ground station (with an uplink and downlink 
bandwidth of 1 Mbps and 4 Mbps, respectively), and exploits its experimental control 
box payload to perform the sifting, error correction and privacy amplification.
The satellite passes Xinglong ground station along a sun-synchronous orbit once every 
night starting at around 12:50 PM local time, for a duration of about 5 minutes. About 
10 minutes before the satellite enters the shadow zone, its attitude is adjusted to point 
at the ground station. When the satellite exceeds an elevation angle of 5° from the 
ground station’s horizon plane, a pointing accuracy of better than 0.5° is achieved. Then 
the APT systems start bidirectional tracking and pointing to guarantee that the 
transmitter and receiver are robustly locked through the whole orbit. From about 15° 
elevation angle, the QKD transmitter sends randomly modulated signal and decoy
photons, together with the beacon laser for timing synchronization, which are received 
and detected by the ground station. A single-orbit experiment ends when the satellite 
reaches 10° elevation angle in the other end (see Methods).
Since September 2016, we have been able to successfully perform QKD routinely under 
good atmospheric condition. Figure 3a shows the data for the orbit on 19th December 
2016 with the minimal (maximal) separation of 645 km (1200 km). Within a duration 
of 273 s for the QKD data collection, the ground station collected 3,551,136 detection 
events, and thereof 1,671,072 bits of sifted keys (see Fig. 3b). The sifted key rate 
decrease from ~12 kbit/s at 645 km to ~1 kbit/s at 1200 km, because of the increase of 
both the physically separated distance and the effective thickness of the atmosphere 
near the earth at smaller elevation angles. The time trace of the sifted key rate in Fig. 
3b demonstrates that we are able to obtain the keys through the whole duration reliably.
We note, however, more pronounced key rate fluctuation is observed in the central 
points when the satellite passes through the ground station around the top, where its
effective angular velocity reaches maximum, ~1°/s, thus placing stringent demand on 
the APT system. Figure 3c shows the observed quantum bit error rate (QBER) with an 
average of 1.1%, consistent with the expected error rate due to background noise and 
polarization visibility. The QBERs become slightly higher in the second half of the orbit
when the ground telescope points to Beijing that brings more city stray light.
We then perform error correction and privacy amplification to obtain final keys. After 
randomly shuffling the sifted key, a hamming algorithm is used for error correction. 
Further, we perform privacy amplification to reduce Eve’s possible knowledge by 
applying random matrix over the corrected keys. Moreover, we take into account of the 
intensity fluctuation for the signal state and decoy state (<5%), and we calculate secure 
final key of 300,939 bits when the statistical failure probability is set to be 10-9,
corresponding to a key rate of ~1.1 kbit/s. As in previous experiments24,25, here the key 
analysis doesn’t consider information leakage due to possible side channels such as the 
imperfect spatial, temporal and spectral overlap of the quantum light sources.
The QKD experiments performed at 23 different days is summarized in Extended Data 
Table 3 and Extended Data Figure 9, where the physical distance between the satellite 
and the ground station varies for different days. The shortest satellite-to-station distance 
depends on the highest altitude angle of the day, which varies from 507.0 km at 85.7°
to 1034.7 km at 25.0°. The obtained sifted key has a peak rate of 40.2 kbits/s at 530 km 
and decreases at larger distances, for instance, to 1.2 kbits/s at 1034.7 km. From 
Extended Data Figure 9, we also observe the key rate fluctuation due to different 
weather conditions. The QBERs are measured to be in the 1%-3% range.
We compare the performance of our satellite-based QKD with what expected from the 
conventional method of direct transmission through telecommunication fibers. Figure 
4 shows the extracted link efficiency at the distance from 645 km to 1200 km from the 
observed count rate, together with theoretically calculated link efficiency using fibers
with 0.2 dB/km loss. Despite the short coverage time (273 s per day) using the Micius
satellite and the need for reasonably good weather condition, an increasing efficiency 
enhancement is pronounced at long distances. At 1200 km, the satellite-based QKD
within the 273 s coverage time demonstrates a channel efficiency that is ~20 orders of 
magnitudes higher than using the optical fiber. As a comparison with our data in Fig. 
3b, through a 1200 km fiber, even with a perfect 10-GHz single-photon source and ideal 
single-photon detectors with no dark count, one would obtain only 1-bit sifted key over 
six million years.
Discussion and outlook
We have reported the first satellite-to-ground quantum communication experiment over 
1200 km distance scale. Our satellite can be further exploited as a trustful relay to
conveniently connect any two points on the earth for high-security key exchange. For 
example, we can first implement QKD in Xinglong, after which the key is stored in the 
satellite for 2 hours until it reaches Nanshan station near Urumqi, by a distance of ~2500
km from Beijing. By performing another QKD between the satellite and the Nanshan
station, and using one-time-pad encoding, secure key between Xinglong and Nanshan 
can then be established. Future experimental plan also includes intercontinental secure 
key exchanges between China and Austria, Italy, and Germany.
Thus far, the low-Earth-orbit satellite has shortcomings of limited coverage area and 
amount of time spent in each ground station. To increase the coverage, we plan to launch 
satellites at higher orbit and construct a satellite constellation, which require the 
development of new techniques to increase the link efficiency, including larger-size
telescopes, better APT systems, and wave-front correction through adaptive optics.
Higher-orbit satellites, however, will spend less time in the earth’s shadow. Day-time 
QKD can be implemented using telecommunication wavelength photons and improved 
spatial and spectral filtering30.
The satellite-based QKD can be linked to metropolitan quantum networks where fibers
are sufficient and convenient to connect numerous users within a city at ~100 km scale31.
We can thus envision a space-ground integrated quantum network, enabling quantum 
cryptography—most likely the first commercial application of quantum information—
useful at a global scale.
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Figure captions:
Figure 1 | Illustration of the experimental set-up. a, Overview of the satellite-to-
ground QKD. The Micuis satellite, weighted 635 kg, flies along a sun-synchronous orbit 
at an altitude of ~500 km. It is equipped with three space-qualified payloads to 
accomplish a series of space-scale quantum experiments including QKD, Bell test, and 
teleportation. b, Schematic of the decoy-state QKD transmitter which is one of the 
satellite payloads. Attenuated laser pulses (~850 nm) from eight separate laser diodes 
(LD1, ···, LD8) pass through a BB84 encoding module (that consists of two PBSs, a 
HWP and a BS), co-aligned with a green laser beam (LA1) for system tracking and time 
synchronization, and is sent out through a 300 mm aperture Cassegrain telescope. After 
WKH%%PRGXOHDaȝ: laser is used as a polarization reference. A two-axis gimbal 
mirror (GM1) in the output of the telescope and a large field-of-view camera (CAM1)
are combined for coarse tracking loop control. Two fast steering mirrors (FSM) and a 
fast camera (CAM2) are used for fine tracking. c, Schematic of the decoy-state QKD 
decoder in the Xinglong ground station that equipped with a 1000-mm-aperture 
telescope. The received 532 nm laser is separated by a dichromic mirror (DM) and split 
into two paths: one is imaged by a camera (CAM3) for tracking, and the other one is 
detected for time synchronization. The 850 nm decoy-state photons are analyzed by a 
BB84 decoder that consists of a BS and two PBS, and detected by four single-photon 
detectors (SPDs). The ground station sends a red laser (LA2) beam to the satellite for 
system tracking. See Table I for more technical parameters.
Figure 2 | Establishment of a reliable space-to-ground link for quantum state 
transfer. a, Overlaid and time-lapse photographs of tracking laser beams as the satellite 
flies over the Xinglong station. The red and green lasers are sent from the ground and 
the satellite, respectively, with a divergence of 1.2 mrad. b, Long-time tracking error of 
both X and Y axis extracted from the real-time images read out from the fast camera. c, 
Polarization contrast ratio with and without dynamical compensation during one orbit.
Figure 3 | Performance of satellite-to-ground QKD performance during one orbit.
a, The trajectory of the Micuis satellite measured from Xinglong ground station. b, The 
sifted key rate as a function of time and physical distance from the satellite to the station. 
c, Observed quantum bit error rate. See text for detailed discussions on the results and 
see Extended Data Table 2 and Extended Data Figure 8 for additional data on different 
days.
Figure 4 | A comparison of the QKD link efficiencies between direct transmission 
through 0.2 dB/km-loss telecommunication optical fibers (red points) and the 
satellite-to-ground approach (blue points). The link efficiency was calculated by 
dividing the photon intensity arrived in front of the detectors in the receiving ground 
station by that at the satellite transmitter’s output. At a distance of 1200 km, the latter 
(within the satellite coverage time) is more efficient than the former by 20 orders of 
magnitude.
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